announcement. Thus, this movement would require about 5 to 6 percent of the total car park. At present, the movement of these goods through ports requires fewer cars, since some of the imports are believed to be consumed in or near the ports, and the remainder is hauled shorter distances than from the Manchurian border to central China.

The effect on the locomotive park may be estimated as follows, assuming trains averaging 600 tons net, daily performance per operable locomotive averaging 300 kms. and a daily train movement of 360 kms. The 4,200 tons would require 7 trains daily, and with a 13-day turnaround would require movement of a total of 91 trains daily. These trains would perform a total of 33,000 train/kms, which would utilize 110 locomotives daily. Assuming that in any one day 10 percent of the locomotives are not in use, a total park of about 120 locomotives would be required for this movement alone. This is about 5 percent of the estimated locomotive park of 2,500 units. A small additional number of locomotives would be required for yard operations at terminals.

The strain placed on the Chinese locomotive and freight car park could be reduced in two ways: a) Additional rolling stock might be imported from the Western Satellites, such as Soviet Zone of Germany which has set up reserves of this equipment. An indication of this surplus is given by the return of 20,000 freight cars from the USSR to the Soviet Zone of Germany in mid-1952, half of which were in reasonable operating condition. This transfer of freight cars and locomotives might be effected within a period of six months. Some additional cars might also be obtained from the USSR. b) Production might be increased in Communist China. Such production is believed to be increasing, as indicated in ORR IP-279. However, it would probable require a number of years to produce sufficient equipment to relieve the strain resulting from complete blockade if rolling stock were not obtained from other sources.

An indication of Chinese Communist freight car production is given in the announcement that in 1950 and 1951 only 1,419 new freight cars had been built; by contrast the 1950 program, which was apparently not fulfilled, included the construction of 1,500 freight cars in Manchuria alone [redacted], and a total of 2,200 freight cars for all of China (Jenmin Tiehtao, Peking, 1 Dec. 1949, Unclass). Some locomotives were produced in pre-Communist China, but production capacity was impaired prior to the communist takeover and present production is believed very small. 25X1A 25X1A

Increases in Track Capacity

The capacity of routes connecting the USSR and China is apparently being increased. The figures given for the Harbin-Suifenho line assume

4% of the freight car park of 40,000 cars, excluding tank cars. Thus, the transfer of seaborne plus coastwise shipping to railroads would utilize approximately 10 percent of Chinese freight cars. It should be repeated that if coastwise shipping were cut off, at least part of the traffic would no longer move, which would reduce the tonnage thrown on the railroads.

One of the items moving coastwise at present is petroleum products, which are transported from Dairen to such ports as Tsingtao and Shanghai. This freight is moved to Dairen primarily by rail. The additional rail haul required if the coastwise shipping were eliminated would average about 700 kms. This would give a six-day turnaround as calculated above. Assuming this movement to total about 475,000 tons annually, or about 1,300 tons a day, it would use 44 tank cars of 30 tons capacity. With a six-day turnaround, 264 tank cars would be required for this movement, plus an additional 5 percent for cars in repair, equalling about 280 tank cars. The present Chinese tank car park is unknown, although at the end of the war the combined Manchurian and China proper railroad networks had less than 500 tank cars. The receipt of additional tank cars from the USSR may have doubled this total, since one source reported the receipt of 500 tank cars from the Soviet Union at Harbin where work was performed to replace the couplers [redacted]

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25X1C8b

That the tank car park was apparently sufficient for needs in late 1952 is indicated by letters from South China stating that tung oil would be shipped to Hong Kong only in tank cars. While a small number of tank cars are at present in use in China proper for movement of petroleum from ports to interior points, it is likely that additional tank cars would have to be obtained from the Soviet Union to carry the additional movement required by the clockade. This is particularly true when adding to the above figure the tank cars which would be required to carry the estimated 48,000 tons moved annually to China by ocean-going tanker, all of which tonnage would have to be moved from the Manchurian border to its destination.

The effect on the locomotive park may be estimated by using methods similar to those employed earlier. The movement of 10,000 tons daily over 700 km. haul would require about 80 locomotives. In 1945, China proper and Manchuria combined had 4,500 locomotives. Due to removals by the Soviets and other losses during the Nationalist-Communist civil war, this park may have been reduced to 2,500 locomotives. Thus the 80 locomotives, plus the 120 required by freight formerly moved by sea, would total 200 locomotives, which might equal 8 percent of the present total locomotive park. A small number of additional locomotives would be required for yard operations in terminals to handle this additional traffic.

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